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ABSTRACT: Science communication is fundamentally about distribution, knowledge distribution. Like all 
distributions, it raises issues of justice. This paper discusses core issues for contemporary science communication 
by mapping them onto well-defined theories of distributive justice. Importantly, considerations of epistemic 
justice force us to look not only at the classic recipients (the audience), but also at the distributors (science 
communicators), as they are, themselves, also recipients of knowledge.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The field of science communication is premised on what we might call a “lay theory” of 
distributive justice. We might call it ‘lay’ because the motives and reasons given for doing 
science communication touch on some of the key aspects of theories of distributive justice 
without paying systematic attention to them. However, much of the activity that goes on under 
the banner of science communication or public engagement with science is focused on 
distributing knowledge from its reputed points of origin to other points on a wide social map. 
Thus far, most of the ethical problems of the field have been interpreted as problems in the 
relationship between the producers of knowledge and the distributors. To make this more 
concrete, there are worries that science communicators could be “too close” to the scientists 
producing knowledge, thus “hyping” or calling attention to scientific work undeserving of 
public awareness. Alternatively, there are concerns that science communicators are “too 
remote” from the production of knowledge. They might not have the background to effectively 
mediate scientific knowledge, thus spreading error or confusion. These are very worthwhile 
concerns. Other ethical problems have arisen around access to information: Is science 
communication only for the already “information rich”? Do our public institutions such as 
science museums, public broadcasters, and public research institutions do enough to appeal to 
a wide array of publics? This is another important concern. However, what we want to do in 
this short paper is re-focus on the ethical dilemmas that emerge from seeing science 
communicators as knowledge distributors―to turn the lens of distributive justice back on the 
distributors and not the distribution of knowledge.  
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 What has led us on this path is a series of observations about current scenes of 
knowledge distribution. The most glaring contemporary case is of MOOCs (massive online 
open courses) where claims about the “free” availability of knowledge prevail. In 2011, the 
mantra was “let knowledge be free.” Interestingly for the arguments in this paper, by 2013, 
there are a substantial number of knowledge distributors asking why anyone thought this 
knowledge was “free” to be distributed in the first place. While the contexts of science 
communication are diverse (from institutions such as science centers that see science 
communication as a core aim to research institutes that see science communication as 
something they must do), they share some features with the “classic case” of knowledge 
distribution—the university. And so, contemporary arguments about justice in relation to 
knowledge in the university (and in emerging arguments about MOOCs) are remarkably 
relevant to science communication. In 2011, we undertook interviews with 17 university 
lecturers in the sciences who were identified as “early adopters of technology.” The interviews 
aimed to get some basic information about how they were integrating communication 
technologies in their teaching and assessment. We wanted to know if the availability of new 
communication technologies (social media, video capacity on mobile phones, the relative ease 
of podcasting applications, etc.) was making inroads into the teaching of science 
communication in the science disciplines. While we did find that there are innovative practices 
and a keen interest among early adopters and students for science communication activities 
using digital media, our data was full of something else entirely, namely, confusion. 
 This confusion ran along several lines that are also picked up in key issues for the 
general field of science communication. In the following sections, we tease out what we found 
in our data of “confusion” by mapping it onto well-defined theories of distributive justice. We 
use this to talk about some core issues for contemporary science communication. In the last 
section, we focus solely on the problems that science communicators, as distributors of 
knowledge, face in terms of distributive justice.  
2. EQUALITY OF ACCESS: THE OLD STORY 
If you’re just doing a little hand held video off your phone or something then maybe not everybody 
has that capacity. (Interviewee 17) 
During our research, equality of access was commonly mentioned by science academics as a 
serious concern with, and sometimes as a barrier to, the adoption of digital media in tertiary 
teaching. The concern with equality of access is straightforward: not every student has equal, 
or equally good, access to the technology required to fulfil a digital media assessment. 
Consider setting students in an ecology class an assignment to create a blog that describes and 
catalogues the events of a field trip. Many, and probably most, students will have smart 
phones, tabs, laptops or netbooks to use as recording devices. However, not all students will 
have these technologies, and some will need to rely on devices provided by the university, 
assuming the university and/or department is sufficiently well-funded and capable of offering 
their students such support. Moreover, even amongst those who do have devices, not all will 
have equally good devices. In many ways, this is not a new concern; it has always been the 
case that some students are better-resourced than others (better books, better calculators, more 
supportive parents, etc.), and technology is just the new frontier of inequality (Hendrix, 2005). 
Some argue technology is worse than previous instigators of inequalities because, on top of 
maintaining current inequalities, “technology is widening the gap” (Latimer, 2001; Trend, 
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2001). Inequality of access to devices (or equally good devices) was a reoccurring theme with 
the science academics we interviewed and implies a strict or radical egalitarianism view of 
equity. 
 Radical egalitarianism is one of the simplest forms of egalitarianism, and argues, 
broadly, that all members of society ought to have (or at least have access to) the same level of 
“benefits and burdens” (Nielsen, 1979). Radical egalitarianism is fundamentally concerned 
with the equal distribution of welfare and resources (as opposed to the equal distribution of 
opportunity, which will be discussed in section III). These resources need not be limited to 
material resources and can include equal access to employment and equal freedoms, as well as 
equal levels of material goods (Roemer, 1998). In its most basic form, radical egalitarianism 
argues that resources should be redistributed such that “If there are n Fs, each [F] is entitled to 
1/n of all the G,” where G is the set of resources available to the community (Raz, 1978). The 
defining feature of radical egalitarianism is that each individual is equally entitled to the 
resources available to the community, irrespective of desert, what Raz (1978) calls universal 
entitlement. It is this form of egalitarianism that is appealed to in the argument for equality of 
access. The equality of access argument claims that some students have better access to 
technology than others, and that “this technological injustice and digital divide is a threat to 
justice” because each individual is (or should be) equally entitled to the resources available to 
the community, in this case, technology (Hendrix, 2005). But radical egalitarianism faces 
numerous challenges which is why, as Peterson and Ove Hansson explain, it has few “real-life 
adherents, [rather] it is a ‘purified’ standpoint that represents an important element in many 
practical standpoints.” ( 2005) 
 A leading objection to radical egalitarianism as a theory of distributive justice is that it 
assumes universal entitlement: the view that resources (or access to resources) should be 
equally shared irrespective of desert. This view clashes with another fundamental assumption 
of what is just, namely the notion of desert: “that each one of us ought to get what we deserve” 
(Bojer, 2003). Indeed, empirical studies suggest that “egalitarian policies that reward people 
independent of whether they and how much they contribute to society are considered unfair” 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2000). In education, in particular, the notion of desert plays a central role. 
An education system that allocates all students an equal mark irrespective of desert would 
seem rather odd (if not useless). One of the roles of assessments, as the name suggests, is to 
assess the students’ level of understanding, their capacity and so forth. For this to be effective, 
the marks need to reflect the different levels of understanding of a student, their capacity and 
so on, or else the assessment is redundant. The assessment needs to be marked according to 
what the student deserves, at least to some extent. This is clearly contrary to the radical 
egalitarian’s assumption of universal entitlement. However, unless it is the actual use and 
access to the technology that is being assessed and marked, the concerns with desert have little 
teeth with regard to the use of digital media in assessment setting. A more relevant concern 
with radical egalitarianism is that pre-existing injustices are ignored. Radical egalitarianism 
argues that everyone should have an equal share of (or an equal share of access to) the 
resources. But a top-of-the-range computer in the hands of a privileged member of society is a 
more powerful tool than the same computer in the hands of one of the least-privileged 
members of society. It is this latter concern that has led to calls for equality of opportunity (or 
equity of access) as opposed to simply equality of access (Gorski, 2005). But before moving on 
to those arguments, it’s instructive to pause for a moment on the particular case of science 
communication.  
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Case 1: Equality of Access in Science Communication 
Equality of access is pretty much a central pillar for science communication, in some cases its 
entire raison d’être. The argument usually goes something like this (see Gregory, Miller, & 
Earl (1998) and Stocklmayer, Gore, & Bryant (2001) for more and variations): In a democratic 
society where science is supported by the public purse, all members of the public need equal 
access to the results. Science communication is the mode by which science is made public 
(note the invisibility of science communicators in this process, a feature to which we will 
return in the final section of this paper). This is generally coherent with classical accounts of 
distributive justice, such as Rawlsian and egalitarian accounts, where “the state” is in the role 
of distributor (Sen, 2009; Rawls, 1999). However, this immediately raises a set of difficult 
issues for national science communication policies. In Australia, for example, the Inspiring 
Australia Policy has targeted national science communication and engagement activities at 
“youth” and “regional public.”  For the purposes of argument, let’s consider the focus on 
“youth.” Given that Australia leads many Western nations (including the US) in the quality of 
its primary education system, and that Australia’s scores in science, while certainly not equal 
to Singapore’s, exceed those of the US and many European examples, “the youth” seems an 
inequitable focus as they already enjoy good access to the results of science and even 
specialized attention via teachers in the explanation of science. In short, the emphasis on any 
one group needs to be justified within the frame of “equality of access.”  Such conversations 
are uncomfortable ones as they require reasons for why one group should be privileged over 
another.  
3. EQUITY OF ACCESS: THE CURRENT NARRATIVE 
[C]atering for that very broad spectrum and diversity of students from cultural, social, from areas of 
learning or non-learning, they might be conversant with technology, they might not. So it really does 
create another layer of difficulty. (Interviewee 5) 
A common concern we encountered in our interviews was the fact that users of the technology 
are not uniformly competent with it, often because of social reasons. Importantly, there seems 
to be no moral reason to punish (or reward) individuals because of their varying levels of 
competence. Take gender as an example. In terms of equality of access, statistics released in 
the 2009 report on online participation, Australia in the Digital Economy, indicate that “gender 
has minimal influence on whether people use the internet or their frequency,” with similar 
statistics reported in the United States and Britain (ACMA, 2009; Gorski, 2005; Helsper, 
2010). Despite this equality of access, women do not enjoy the same levels of employment in 
this technology sector as men, nor do they share the same breadth of use of this technology 
(Gorski, 2005; Helsper, 2010).  
 The difference is not equality of access; it is equity of opportunity to use the 
technology, which includes access and support, both technical support and a supportive 
culture. While women may have as much access to digital media and the Internet as men, they 
are not equally welcomed to all parts of it (Gorski, 2005). In some cases, women are simply 
not invited or welcomed to participate in digital media and Internet activities in the same way 
as men are. Socially entrenched sexism permeates throughout the Internet and the perceived 
anonymity offered by the Internet encourages the dissemination of offensive, sexist and racist 
material (Bemiller & Schneider, 2010). In other cases, particularly in professional settings, 
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women face barriers such as the lack of women mentors for new entrants, or less training and 
support compared to their male counterparts (Orser, Riding, & Stanley, 2011). This results in 
an unequal distribution of confidence and competence with regard to ITC.  
 There are many reasons why some groups are less comfortable, confident or competent 
with ITC, ranging from discrimination, to socialization, to socio-economic background (Singh, 
2001). In order to have a fair system, we need to first ensure a level playing field with regards 
to confidence and competence; we need to ensure equity amongst users―where all users can 
use and access all of the digital media as freely and in as supportive an environment as any 
other (Gorski, 2005). Unlike equality of access, equity amongst users cannot be resolved 
simply by controlling the resources allocated to specific groups. Providing students with audio 
recording devices does not make them all equally comfortable in creating a podcast. From a 
distributive justice theory perspective, equity amongst users relies on the principle of equality 
of opportunity and implies a Luck Egalitarianism view of equity. 
 Equality of opportunity is premised on the view that we owe to differentiate between 
the aspects of a person’s life she can be held responsible for, and those she cannot be held 
responsible for (Roemer, 1998). This view, often termed Luck egalitarianism (Mason, 2001), 
holds that “inequalities in the advantages that people enjoy are acceptable if they derive from 
the choices that people have voluntarily made, but that inequalities deriving from unchosen 
features of people’s circumstances are unjust” (Scheffler, 2003).  
 Unchosen features like age, gender, race, or socio-economic background are considered 
the result of brute luck, and inequalities arising from them should be compensated or “be made 
equal, so far as this is possible” (Duus-Otterström, 2011; Dworkin, 2003). The defining 
features of luck egalitarianism is that equality is not measured in terms of resources, as is the 
case with radical egalitarianism, but is measured in terms of opportunity. Whereas strict 
egalitarianism calls for an equal division of resources (or access to resources) amongst 
members of a community, luck egalitarianism calls for an equalization of opportunities by 
addressing existing inequalities stemming from morally irrelevant features. In the case of ICT, 
an endorsement of luck egalitarianism could lead to support for those who are less competent, 
additional training options, or financial compensation, amongst others. 
 In many ways, Luck Egalitarianism strikes a very intuitive note and one that reflects 
much of our societal aspirations. We would not consider “a race where the starting line is 
arbitrarily staggered, where people's prospects for winning are not largely determined by 
factors for which they are responsible but rather largely by luck” as fair, and the same is true 
for a society so structured (Lamont & Favor, 2008). But in some ways, it is inevitable, perhaps 
even desirable, that there will be some inequalities between individuals, including inequalities 
arising from brute luck. Sesardic (1993) claims that “inequalities resemble Russian dolls”: 
once you remove one layer, a new layer of appears. Since, according to Luck Egalitarians, we 
should compensate or make equal (as best we can) any inequalities arising from brute luck, 
once we overcome obvious layers, such as discrimination over race, gender or religion, ought 
we next to turn our attention to natural endowments? The fact Michael Jordan is taller than me 
is a matter of brute luck, similarly with regard to the differences in intellectual prowess 
exhibited by various students. It would seem odd to claim these disparities need to be 
compensated for or equalised.  
 In defense against this objection, luck egalitarians argue for a distinction between 
natural endowments and social endowments. The former are those properties, usually physical 
or biological, that affect an agent’s ability to fulfil her ambitions, while the latter are those 
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which do not inherently affect an agent’s ability to fulfil her ambitions, but only do so in the 
context of social structures and social processes (Pierik, 2006). But this distinction between 
natural endowments and social endowments is a slippery slope since we could almost always 
create social structure to overcome disparities arising from natural endowments. While 
deciding where the boundary between natural and social endowment ought to be set is a 
challenge for luck egalitarianism, the view of justice it aims to convey still resonates deeply 
with both philosophers and the population at large.  
Case 2: Equity of Access in Science Communication 
Science communication, as a field of endeavor, is an interesting case for equity of access as the 
relevant features are so often epistemic in nature. And how should we treat these? While there 
is a wide literature on epistemic justice, it has yet to make inroads into discussions of science 
communication (Fricker, 2007; Langton, 2000; Smith, 2000). If it were to begin to do so, 
several issues would immediately become obvious. First, there may be a difficult question to 
answer about whether one’s ability to engage science stems from one’s natural or social 
endowments, or more probably, both. Much of science communication appeals only to those 
considered “engaged” with science, the assumption being that “engagement with science” is a 
choice. This is probably cognitively not true and raises serious concerns for the luck 
egalitarian. Should science communication aim to engage the natural endowments of audiences 
by teaching people science appropriate to their epistemic capacity, or should science 
communication aim to address the social disadvantage of communities or individuals who have 
little access to science and where being “engaged with science” is frowned upon?  
4. EQUITY FOR DISTRIBUTORS: THE UNSPOKEN TALE 
[Y]ou certainly start getting edicts that you must include a certain amount of new media or your 
teaching is going to be seen as second-rate, and I guess losing the good with the bad from the 
traditional forms of teaching. And certainly a competition between individuals who are very savvy 
with that particular technology, providing, in some respects, an unfair advantage. (Interviewee 8)  
To this point in the paper, as much of the literature, we have concentrated on justice for 
students, or in the case of science communication, for audiences of science communication 
activities. However, what began to emerge in our discussion with lecturers and our 
observations of the role of science communicators is that while they clearly have concerns 
about equity for their students, they also have misgivings about their own position in the 
distributive networks. For example, numerous lecturers mentioned varying degrees in capacity 
to work with digital media. Similarly, science communicators identify a range of issues, from 
evaluation and research techniques, the use of social and digital media, and even dealing with 
hostile community members as areas where they need additional resources and/or training. So, 
while “good” science communication can be seen as a benefit to audiences for science much as 
good teaching can be seen as a benefit for students, there are real questions about the roles 
from which these benefits flow, namely the science communicators or lecturers distributing 
knowledge.  
 For a radical egalitarian, what is important for knowledge distributors is that they have 
equal access to resources for the creation and communication of knowledge. Thus, in the case 
of digital media, if chemistry lecturers have the means to podcast helpful tips to their students, 
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so should lecturers in physics, biology, and English literature. Martha Nussbaum (2012) has 
discussed at length the difficulties universities face in equitably distributing resources among 
fields of scholarly endeavor and teaching. She powerfully makes the case that inequality in this 
field of distribution has significant “trickle-down” effects and also impacts the quality of 
knowledge produced in specific fields. So, the radical egalitarian might ask, does every science 
communicator have access to the same resources for communication? The rather immediate 
and obvious answer would seem to “no,” but their access is hindered at many levels. A recent 
study in Australia (Department of Innovation Industry Science and Research and Tertiary 
Education, 2012) indicated that certain areas of science are favored for science communication 
activities (environment, health, water). Those areas are emphasized in research, in resources to 
support communication activities, and in the training of science communicators. We might 
agree that these are the areas where opportunity should be enhanced, but for the radical 
egalitarian, those science communicators left to communicate about mining science, physics, 
and nanotechnology have legitimate complaints about their diminished access to resources.  
Another level that might trouble the radical egalitarian is the resource hierarchy generated by 
institutions. In Australia, the CSIRO can afford to resource about 400 science communicators; 
an NGO, such as “healthy waterways,” might resource two to a lesser degree. For the science 
communicator standing up at a public event, the resource allocation has significant effects on 
their ability to communicate knowledge generated by their institution. While it is tempting to 
rush to criticize this resource allocation and the effects it has on what audiences hear about 
science, there is an ethical problem for the radical egalitarian at the level of the science 
communicator who has been compromised by unequal access to resources.  
 The luck egalitarian might be able to quickly dispense with these worries by arguing 
that these inequities are due to social decision making; we have, as a society, decided that we 
want to resource certain areas over others (water over nanotechnology, for example). But more 
troubling issues for science communication emerge at the global scale for the luck egalitarian. 
As “science” itself has an unequal profile globally, so does science communication. The World 
Federation of Science Journalists (WFSJ), for example, following luck egalitarian intuitions, 
have poured resources into Africa and Middle Eastern nations where science communicators 
have been under-resourced in both communication and epistemic terms. Thabo Mbeki’s denial 
of the cause of AIDS in Africa was abetted by the poor resourcing of science communicators to 
offer counter-narratives (Claassen, 2011).  There is now a strong organization (SAASTA) in 
South Africa to continue in this vein and the WFSJ has added additional training resources for 
science communicators in order to provide more equal access to the opportunities for science 
communication.  
Case 3: Equity for Distributors in Science Communication 
Around the world, there has been recognition that science journalism plays an important 
science communication role, yet journalists come to the task of science communication with 
varied histories, experiences, and abilities. One popular remedy to ensure accurate reporting is 
to create knowledge brokerage houses, called Science Media Centres (these currently exist in 
the UK, Australia, Europe, and one is being developed in the US). The questions arise: What 
are these centers doing? Whom are they serving? On the one hand, they are ensuring that broad 
publics have access to equally good information. This would make the radical egalitarian 
happy indeed. On the other hand, they sometimes focus on compensating for the differences in 
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knowledge and expertise held by different reporters. This appeals to the sensibilities of a luck 
egalitarian but is applied to distributors, not to the ultimate audiences for science.  
 This focus on the distributors, at least in part, is an important ethical turn for science 
communication, acknowledging that not only are science communicators themselves 
distributors, but they are also recipients of distribution. The arguments for and against science 
media centers pick up on this issue and raise important challenges. Should it be the role of a 
science media center to provide the same information to all reporters? Some science journalists 
have argued that their edge in the field relies on their ability to gather and tell stories—that is 
exactly what they trained for. They don’t want nor need a science media center. Editors have 
largely welcomed the development as it enables the audience access to quality science 
reporting at a general level, regardless of the training or specialism of their reporters. Thanks to 
the science media center, all reporters can cover science.  Note that this raises a different line 
of argument than the longstanding one that we should train specialist science mediators to 
ensure quality information for everyone. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We’ve used some interviews with science lecturers and some recent survey data on science 
communicators to raise a range of issues about the ethical stance of science communicators. 
We recognize that there are differences between teachers and science communicators. But, 
given the explicit attention to equality in education, lecturers operate as an important limit case 
for science communication. For science communicators, whose roles are variously formalized, 
the issues appear somewhat murkier. However, in places like Australia where there is a formal 
job title of “science communicator” and science journalists tend not to object to the association 
with science communication, there is a real opportunity to address some of these inequities at 
the level of training and national policy. We also recognize that we have been “assuming” at 
some level that science communication is a “social good.” We are not naïve enough to assume 
that all strategic communication for science plays this role. However, with the principle of 
charity, if we can find the problems for science communication in the best light, this will 
extend further to other problems emergent in the field.  
 A standard argument for science communication relies on a radical egalitarian view—
everyone should have equal access to science. However, there are trends that suggest that 
intuitions driven by luck egalitarianism are emerging. These push the field in different ways 
and raise the possibilities of incongruent ethical positions. From a justice point of view, this 
raises interesting questions. Theories of justice are supposed to be universally applicable and 
not relative to context. But we suggest that context does matter. The theory of justice that we 
appeal to when assessing the distribution of knowledge to the ultimate audience for science 
communication is often different to, and conceptually incompatible with, the theory of justice 
we appeal to when distributing knowledge to the distributors. For science communication and 
knowledge distribution, grand theories of justice may not be helpful. 
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